

# THE COUNCIL OF STELLAR MANAGEMENT

IMPLEMENTATION OF DELIBERATIVE, DEMOCRATICALLY ELECTED, COUNCIL IN EVE

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## A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF REAL STRUCTURAL SOCIAL EVOLUTION WITH THE VIRTUAL SOCIETY OF EVE ONLINE

Analyzing structural social evolution begins with understanding the fundamental behavior of individuals. Aristotle argued that there were three general activities of man: *theoria*, or the pursuit of truth; *poiesis*, which is the drive for production; and *praxis*, or “practical”, which is the genesis of action. Hannah Arendt criticized this comparison in the 20th century, stating that it only applied to free men, and suggested another division: labor, the most basic process of staying alive via either biological processes or food gathering; work, the process of creating ‘artificial’ items distinctly different from natural environments; and action as the only activity that goes on between humans without any assistance of intermediary things or matter. Action is the necessary condition of public scenes that comprise a public sphere. A public sphere is in turn where all politics take place, and power comes into being where people gather for action.

Whenever people gather, activity is present in at least one of three forms: awareness of the self-relative to the environment; identifying value for themselves within the environment; and taking necessary action to pursue self-oriented values. Existing within this environment and sharing it—willingly or otherwise—with other persons encourages the development of social structures in which people must either create space and livelihood for themselves, or compete with others for it.

But, applying this observation as a means of quantifying sociocultural progression is problematic. One modern social theory speaks to a “unilinear” evolution in which society marches along predefined “milestones”, beginning with hunter-gatherer status, advancing to tribal status, and then ultimately a “stratified” status which yields the emergence of civilization. Yet examples abound of “multilinear” evolution as well, in which disparate cultures merge and either accelerate, retreat, or even branch away from the original progression of societal emergence into different directions entirely.

In fact, the only consensus in the study of sociocultural evolution is that no single theory can aptly describe the universal development and progression of any society. Myriad factors ranging from geographical location to religious beliefs, and even weather conditions—prevailing or roguish—all complicate the analysis; introducing the most subtle variable could drastically alter the course of two societies that would have otherwise evolved along similar paths.

Thus, it is these general paths—or unilinear milestones—that this paper will draw real-world comparisons from. The purpose of the analogy is to establish the foundation for implementing a deliberative, democratically elected, council in EVE. This is by no means an endorsement of any social evolution theory; a comparison with actual civilizations is beyond the scope of this analysis. But it will demonstrate the striking similarities between this theory of real life societal development and the virtual society evolution of EVE, while also relying on one key assumption about individuals in both realms: that they are motivated by the pursuit of value, the core of

which is driven by their instinct for survival.

## **HUNTER-GATHERER BANDS**

This was how EVE began. When the game was officially launched in May 2003, no established player infrastructure existed, and all players started with equal opportunity to advance within the society. Hunter-gatherer structures emerged even before the launch date: anticipating the release of the game, groups of players participated in the game beta<sup>1</sup>, gathering data and hunting for as much advanced knowledge as possible, including possible advancement paths in the virtual world and identifying which resources would likely hold the most value once the game went live.

The important distinction is that the beta—and thus the initial virtual society—was only available to selected individuals, since its purpose was to run a live test of the game’s technology before official release. Thus, the society existing before May 2003 could be regarded as a partly elitist society, which carried forward to the real launch in the sense that these players had advanced knowledge of how to accumulate value quickly once the official simulation began. At this stage, when EVE opened its doors for all, the society quickly evolved from hunter-gatherer status to tribal status.

## **TRIBAL SOCIETIES, IN WHICH THERE ARE SOME LIMITED INSTANCES OF SOCIAL RANK AND PRESTIGE**

Immediately after the game world opened, the first corporations<sup>2</sup> formed. These social structures advanced EVE towards a tribal society, in which “structure” was necessitated as the population grew. Once in place, players began to claim physical (virtual) space for themselves, with one or more leaders providing direction to the “working force” of corporations. Identical to the real world’s tribal behavior, wars were fought for control over regions<sup>3</sup> in space; even when individual members had differing notions about how these regions created value for themselves or their organization, corporations with strong leadership were able to maintain uniformity of purpose. Naturally, some corporations—or tribes—flourished in this sociocultural environment, often times at the expense of others.

## **STRATIFIED STRUCTURES, LED BY CHIEFTAINS**

As more inhabitants entered the game, societal evolution was increasingly shaped by the need to manage conflicts of interests within the corporation. This precipitated the formation of stratified divisions: diplomatic, mining, manufacturing, and fighting units all emerged to maximize the strengths of the corporation as a single entity. Those organizations with spare capacity began offering specialized services to other corporations, primarily as protectors or attack forces, and occasionally as resource gatherers.

## **CIVILIZATIONS, WITH COMPLEX SOCIAL HIERARCHIES AND ORGANIZED GOVERNMENT INSTITUTIONS**

As the relationships between groups of collaborating corporations matured, alliances were formally introduced in the game. This step marked the transition of EVE to a civilization, in which member corporations shared power in an advanced society with an established government structure. Just as individuals adapted to specialized roles within the corporation, entire corporations adapted to specific roles within the alliance, and the collective value of this collaboration flowed from the individual to the group and back. Players enforced

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<sup>1</sup> The pre-launch version of the game used primarily as a testing resource.

<sup>2</sup> The corporation is the primary social unit of EVE Online, complete with a CEO and “template” organization hierarchy that is intended to be shaped by players.

<sup>3</sup> “Regions” are groups of constellations and form the largest individual “physical” entities in space. A single region typically holds dozens of star systems and contains vast resources.

alliance command chains on their own—only rudimentary technical support for an organizational hierarchy existed at the time. Socioeconomic pressure was the main driving force behind the creation and implementation of this structure. Powerful regional governments thrived in these conditions, claiming vast swaths of space to the envy of other citizens in EVE.

Clearly, a political evolution took place at the corporate, alliance, and society level as well. Corporate ambitions aligned at the alliance level were at constant odds with opposing alliances in the competition for resources. Players at each tier of the society were bound by the political mandates of the group, such as defining where players could and couldn't travel, or which resources were accessible as determined by the group's politics versus other alliances.

Different political models for value disbursement in support of the group also emerged autonomously. Fiercely capitalistic ventures appeared in which group members competed directly with each other to accumulate the most wealth, believing that the collective sum of individual gains would make the entire group stronger. On the other extreme, some purely communistic enterprises required members to surrender ownership of personal items to the group, believing that common ownership of value was paramount to thriving in the greater society.

But since this entire socioeconomic dynamic must exist within the technical framework provided by CCP, it must have also evolved in part because of CCP. In that sense, the inhabitants of EVE could view their society as a dictatorship, since they have had little direct say in how it has been governed. Any influence citizens may have exerted was more a consequence of the vendor-customer relationship, as expressed in the business terms of growth projections and client relations.

Yet feedback between CCP and its customers—or members of the society— was always present in the interest of adapting the product to meet consumer demands. In examining this with a political view, describing the relationship as a “dictatorship” would be inaccurate, since it implies absolute control over the society with little regard to the opinion of those residing within it. On the contrary, constructive interaction and open dialogue between the legislator— CCP—and society members took place with the mutual aim of improving the society as much as possible. To the extent that the success of this arrangement can be measured, consider that as of the time of this writing, EVE's society has grown from approximately 30.000 in 2003 to more than 390.000 in 2013.

Until now, comparisons of political philosophy and social structures in the virtual world have been drawn from parallels with the real one. But it cannot be stressed enough that today, with this many people comprising the civilization of EVE—and the potential ripple-effect of any change in the way this society is governed— further legislative applications based mostly on CCP's interpretation of the real world are likely to cause more harm than good. To achieve continued success, EVE's society must be granted a larger role in exerting influence on the legislative powers of CCP. Governance of virtual worlds is a unique endeavor; there is no precedence to follow. Thus, governance between CCP and society will be crafted with three specific observations about the game in mind:

First, every individual starts their experience in EVE on equal footing<sup>4</sup>. There are no class differences—economic, educational, racial, or otherwise—to disadvantage the potential that any new player has to thrive within the game. All members of this society have the same opportunity, limited only by their own ambitions, innate abilities, and to a degree, luck.

Second, there is a social contract system<sup>5</sup> in effect in EVE. New players cannot join the society without agreeing to the terms of the EULA, or “End User License Agreement”, which spells out not only the technical restrictions imposed, but also establishes the conduct by which players may treat each other in a real- world context via

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<sup>4</sup> “5k and a frigate”, specifically. A reference to the 5,000 ISK—the fictitious currency used in EVE—and starter ship that every player begins the game with.

<sup>5</sup> The social contract is one of the most influential thought-exercise (John Rawls, Theory of Justice 1971) in political philosophy in the 20th century. In short the theory states that in order to have a completely secure/just/rightful (depends on the author using the idea) every single member of the society has to accept the laws of the society before he joins it.

interactions in the game<sup>6</sup>. Individuals have complete freedom in choosing whether or not to agree to these terms, and may even join temporarily to evaluate EVE's society before committing to sustained participation. But in the end, becoming a permanent part of EVE requires entering into this social contract.

Third, although CCP establishes the rules by which players may interact with each other in a real-world context, they do not interfere with how individuals treat each other in a virtual context. Strictly speaking, CCP has the power to govern actions in the virtual world via "natural laws", or the literal technical limitations of the game. But within this same virtual universe, abusing the trust of other individuals is an affair that is left to society itself to contend with. Crimes are not persecuted by the legislator here:<sup>7</sup> the fate of peers who commit wrongdoings such as theft, fraud, destruction of property, and even "murder"<sup>8</sup> is determined exclusively by the society. Justice, as it were, is in the hands of those who choose to exercise their right to take it, and under no circumstances will the legislator interfere— again, provided that the means of execution complies with the "meta-law" of the EULA and Terms of Service (TOS).

## **A REVIEW OF PLAYER RIGHTS BY PARTICIPATING IN THE EVE COMMUNITY**

By becoming part of the EVE community, players can be said to possess three intrinsic, broadly described rights. These rights are integral to the continued growth of virtual society and establishing the optimal balance in governance between individuals and the legislator.

### **FREEDOM FROM UNDUE EXTERNAL INFLUENCES**

First, individuals have the right to be free of undue external influences in the virtual society. To enforce this right, the EULA, TOS and other legal documents define the boundary which separates a player's real-life actions from his or her virtual ones. As mentioned earlier, this is a non-negotiable social contract that is essential for maintaining the cohesion of any virtual society. These rules establish a framework for real-world personal behavior and decision making that limits the amount of external influence that can be leveraged in the game world.

### **UNLIMITED INTERACTION WITH OTHER INDIVIDUALS**

Next, individuals have the right to unlimited interaction with other individuals in the virtual society. Players are free to take any action allowable within the "natural laws" of the game, and as such are governed only by their free will. This right is universal to all individuals, regardless of intent. As such, this freedom leaves them wholly unprotected from the consequences of their actions, regardless of if those consequences are just or not.

### **INFLUENCE ON HOW SOCIETY IS LEGISLATED**

Finally, individuals have the right to influence how society is legislated. Until now, this right has not been fully

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<sup>6</sup> The exact terms defining the limits of player-to-player interactions are defined in the Terms of Service (TOS), which is incorporated in the EULA by reference.

<sup>7</sup> Technically, wrongdoings committed within "high security" space are persecuted by a non-player law enforcement agency known as CONCORD. But they only intervene when one ship opens fire on another within these enforcement zones—they do not intervene in cases of theft or fraud.

<sup>8</sup> No player is ever truly "murdered" because each one has a "clone copy" of himself. But there is always a steep cost for being murdered, measured in any combination of the following: lost time, skill points, money, and possessions.

accessible. The goal of CCP is to provide EVE's individuals with societal governance rights. In similar fashion to a real-world democracy models, candidates will be selected by fellow peers to be the voice of their interests to the legislator. Once elected, the responsibility of these representatives will be to uphold the society's views as best they can via direct contact and dialogue with CCP. Central to this concept is the idea that increasing the "utility" of EVE's society will encourage more individuals to join it.

As the population grows, so does the urgency for individuals to participate in the society's political environment. A government model in which a single power holds all authority weakens the bond of trust between individuals and the legislator, and impedes the growth and overall utility of society. In most democratic models, government legislators can either be replaced by popular vote or are limited by finite term durations. Because EVE is a virtual society that relies on the technical support of CCP, this model cannot be emulated.

What can be done is to redistribute some power back to individuals and increase the contact points where the most direct influence on society can be exerted: by awarding selected player representatives the same opportunity to discuss and debate the ongoing evolution of EVE that CCP employees have.

## ORIGINS OF THE DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY

### HISTORY

Recognizing that the unique socioeconomic climate of EVE would eventually necessitate the implementation of a formal government structure, the idea of establishing a player representative body originated as early as 2001, when the game was still in its design stages. Two years later, the first attempt to create a "Council of Stellar Management", or CSM, concept was spearheaded by then-acting community manager Valery 'Pann' Massey. In her words:

"This was a group of player representatives that would meet in-game every other week to discuss the most pressing topics related to the EVE game world with various members of the EVE dev team.

Even before the first iteration of the CSM, the need for a council of some sort was something that the CCP guards knew would arise some day and they discussed it from time to time. The CSM v.1.0 was a crude, fundamental experiment in how to go about it, but it was far from being the perfect solution. Something more was needed, even if no one was quite sure how to go about it...

In time, the program was abandoned for a number of reasons. Chief among these was that due to the nature of the text-only chat, it could be a bit dry and boring, and not very efficient, because of the long wait time for people to enter their questions or responses; only a handful of topics could be covered in each meeting. It was also inconvenient for the devs to take time out of their day to participate. Finally, putting the council together could be quite time consuming."

In this first implementation, CSM members were selected from a pool of player applicants by CCP personnel. Selection criteria included factors such as the size of their respective corporation, total time spent online, and "visibility" on the EVE Online forums. Each week, representatives from differing playstyles would meet CCP devs in a private chat channel to discuss the game. Each council operated for six weeks at a time, with three to six total meetings occurring during period. At the council's conclusion, the selection process started over again<sup>9</sup>.

At the 2005 EVE Fanfest, CCP's Dr. Kjartan Pierre Emilsson presented the idea of a democratic voting system for EVE in a lecture he called "Empires: Managing Emerging Social Structures". In it, he suggested the possible use of a constitution as a means of "deciding how to decide" among groups. Because of its "universal" visibility, the

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<sup>9</sup> A news item detailing the application process can be found here <http://community.eve-online.com/news.asp?a=single&nid=216&tid=1> ; the date being 21st of November 2003.

precepts of a constitution would scale to each tier of society, even without enforcement, among both individuals and groups. This very concept, combined with the idea of player representation in a formal governance structure, lends itself to the paradigm of a “deliberative democracy”.

## **DEFINITION**

The deliberative democracy is a hybrid governance solution which combines consensus decree with representative authority. In this system, every individual is considered equal and has the right to voice an opinion whose relevance carries just as much weight as every other voice in society. Since creating an authentic deliberative democracy is impossible due to the technical means through which EVE is supported, the proposed implementation of this concept will rest more upon representative individuals to steer a common voice. In this way, the consensus of deliberative minds and the open discourse of issues will be the primary vehicle of political change within society.

## **IMPLEMENTATION CONCEPTS**

The public election of the fourteen representatives will be performed via democratic methods. Every active account—or social contract—holds a single vote, which may be used to indicate support for one or more candidates. The resulting council will then work with the community and CCP to ensure that community concerns were properly reflected in CCP's decision-making process.

Because representatives have clearly stated obligations once they are elected, there are almost no restrictions on candidate eligibility<sup>10</sup>. There is little risk with leaving the eligibility format open because of the limited duration of term periods (twelve months) and complete transparency of the CSM's work to voters. The council's actions, good or bad, will not be forgotten by voters easily, and no representative can go against the wishes of voters for long.

## **POLITICAL THEORY AND THE CASE FOR DEMOCRATICALLY ELECTED COUNCIL IN EVE**

To draw comparisons of this solution with real political theory, both John Locke<sup>11</sup> and Montesquieu<sup>12</sup> identified the need to distribute power within a state in the 16th and 17th century. The evolution of EVE passed this “social age” at least one year ago, and thus the case for acting in accordance with these theories is apparent. To an extent, societal development already began moving in this direction with the establishment of EVE TV and EON, an independent media presence within EVE. Delivering news that is unedited and uncensored by the legislator is considered a key requisite for a democratic state today.

Further, in December 2006, a Ph.D. economist was hired by CCP to become the effective director of the “EVE Central Bank”. His responsibility is to monitor the economic state of EVE, analyze market data, and produce quarterly reports detailing monetary conditions. This effort offers more transparency to individuals about the society and its legislator, empowering them with insight on how to maximize the value of economic trends around them. But more importantly, it provides data they can use to raise topics which impact their personal utility to Representatives.

The key difference between a deliberative democracy and representative democracies is that Representatives do not rule on behalf of constituents.

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<sup>10</sup> Restrictions are explained in Part IV.

<sup>11</sup> John Locke wrote about the separation of power in his Two Treatises of Government (1689) where he argues against one supreme ruler holding all power over a society.

<sup>12</sup> Montesquieu (1689 – 1745) wrote extensively about the Separation of Powers within a state.

Instead, they act with the consensus of the entire constituency as they present collective interests to the legislator. Every citizen owes the others justification for the laws imposed upon society; in this way, the theory is “deliberative” because of the social cooperation required to bring issues to “lawful” conclusions before a governing assembly<sup>13</sup>.

## **METAGAMING CONSIDERATIONS**

There is a metagaming component to the proposed implementation in EVE, particularly where it concerns voting. For example, each real-life individual can hold many game accounts, each of which has at least one virtual persona controlled by a single owner. Although this technically gives more weight to individuals with an external monetary advantage, the impact is negligible in the greater scale of participating voters. Furthermore, the possibility exists that constituents will be apathetic about their voting power, just as in real-world politics but being aware of that possibility is the most powerful weapon in countering it.

## **IMPLEMENTING A DELIBERATIVE, DEMOCRATICALLY ELECTED, COUNCIL IN EVE**

### **REPRESENTATIVE CANDIDATE ELIGIBILITY**

Anyone who has held an EVE Online account for more than sixty (60) days is eligible to campaign for a representative seat on the CSM, with the following exceptions: employees, volunteers, interns, affiliates, strategic partners, employees of other gaming companies/games and family members of CCP are all ineligible. Elected members of the CSM must maintain their eligibility during their term in order to remain on the council.

Also, players with a serious warning or ban on any account in their possession can be excluded from candidate eligibility. However, in-game behavior or public opinions, regardless of play style, will never be a criterion for candidacy unless the rules of the EULA and/or TOS are violated.

All candidates must verify their identity to CCP before they can officially be acknowledged as a candidate. All candidates must be 21 years old or older in order to qualify as a candidate and hold a valid passport at the date of the candidacy evaluation that allows for international travel and admission to Iceland and participation on the CSM. Because election winners will ultimately make appearances on EVE-TV, EON or other media, candidates must run under their real-life names, and may either create a new character or use an existing account name to give themselves an in-game identity.

### **VOTER ELIGIBILITY**

Any active EVE Online account that is at least a full thirty (30) days in age is eligible to vote. Only one vote per account—not per character—is permitted. The thirty-day account exclusion rule is to limit undue metagaming influence in the election, and is in line with the precepts of a modern democracy that imposes a minimum age for voting privileges. The only exclusion rule for voting is CCP employee accounts, which are ineligible. Affiliates, volunteers, partners, and interns are permitted to vote.

### **ELECTION MECHANICS**

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<sup>13</sup> Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson. 2004. Page 126.

Each candidate must secure the support of 200 individuals (one account can only support one candidate) in order to appear on the final ballot. If the number of candidates is lower than 28 meeting this criteria the ballot is filled with the next highest ranking candidate until the final ballot has 28 candidates. This pre-election mechanic is designed to focus the election.

Each account may cast a single vote for one or more candidates – maximum of fourteen (14) candidates. Each ballot thus consists of a list of one or more candidates, listed in order of preference.

Ballots are anonymous, but ballot tallies (the count of each uniquely appearing list of candidates in ballots) and the code used for the counting of the ballots are published to allow 3rd-party validation of the results.

To maximize participation, the polls will be open for a full two weeks. Once the polls have closed, the results are determined using a Single Transferrable vote method (STV) to determine the 14 (fourteen) candidates who are elected onto the council.

## **THE COUNCIL STRUCTURE**

Within seven days of the general election, the Representatives must hold an internal vote to determine Officers: a Chairman, Vice-Chairman, Secretary, and Vice-Secretary. If there are two candidates for a position, the winner is determined by a simple majority vote; if there are multiple candidates, then multiple ballots are cast, with each ballot eliminating the candidate with the least number of votes. In the event of a tie between any two candidates, the representative who was elected to the CSM with the highest ranking from the election will cast the tie-breaking vote.

If an Officer is no longer able or willing to perform his duties, a new Officer will be elected to replace them using the same election process.

The CSM is a “flat” organization, and Officers do not have special powers, only additional responsibilities. The responsibilities of the Chairman and Vice-Chairman are to handle official communications between the CSM and CCP, and they are expected to be particularly active in interacting with the community. The responsibilities of the Secretary and Vice-Secretary are related to the production of official CSM publications such as the CSM Summit Minutes. Thus, CSM Officers are expected to be the most active members of the CSM.

Alternates are not part of the council structure; fourteen members are elected to the council and if a member, for whatever reason, is unable to serve on the council, it will carry on without a replacement member.

## **ATTENDANCE AT CSM SUMMITS AND FANFEST**

At least twice a year, CCP will convene multi-day summit meetings in Reykjavik; in addition, each year CCP holds its FanFest convention. Seven members of the CSM attend these events in person. The members who attend in person will be determined as follows:

- The two CSM members elected with the highest ranking from the election, who are able to attend, will be present at both summit meetings and FanFest.
- The other five positions will be decided upon by CCP in cooperation with the CSM, based on their activity on the CSM and their expertise as it relates to the expected topics of discussion.

## **CSM TERM DURATION**

Council terms, will last twelve months, and elections will follow the expiration of each term. This timeframe corresponds roughly to the expansion release cycles of EVE Online.



## **VOTER COMMUNICATION WITH THE CSM**

A dedicated electronic forum will be provided for voters to present issues to CSM Representatives. Because this is a “gathering place” where topics deemed important to society are heard and acted upon by democratically elected Representatives, moderators must be present to keep discussions civilized, ordered, relevant, and lawful<sup>14</sup>. These measures are necessary here, as they are in real society, to keep the unruly from disrupting any civil institution ranging from courts of law to the halls of legislative government bodies.

In the spirit of encouraging as much debate and discussion as possible, any voter may present any topic at any time in this forum, and there is no limit to the number of topics they can introduce—as long as they are genuine, relevant, and well- articulated. In addition, they may participate in as many existing topics opened by fellow voters as they please. The burden of demonstrating the legitimacy or urgency of the issue rests with the voters themselves. A good idea will generate momentum all on its own, and it is the task of the CSM to not only track these discussions, but to engage the populace as much as possible in the interest of sustaining that momentum until the issue is brought to closure.

## **CSM COMMUNICATION WITH VOTERS**

Council Representatives are expected to communicate with the voting community through the topic forums mentioned above, but also with individuals as necessary through any means they agree upon. Furthermore, communications regarding the Council’s activities are to be given to the voters throughout the term.

## **COMMUNICATION BETWEEN CCP AND CSM**

Council Representatives are expected to be ready and able to make themselves available for online meetings with CCP, and vice versa, given an appropriate timeframe. The Council Representatives will also be expected to be available for formal feedback on ‘work in progress’ matters by CCP – where the Representatives will be among other CCP entities giving comments.

## **CSM REPRESENTATIVE CONDUCT**

Any behavior or actions considered being a material breach of the EULA or TOS by a CSM Representative is grounds for immediate dismissal and permanent exclusion from all pending and future participation in the council. There are no exceptions, regardless of the infraction. Representatives are not only expected to uphold the social contract that all society members are held accountable to, but should also set a behavior standard for everyone else to follow.

## **THE NDA**

CSM Representatives must sign a Non-Disclosure Agreement, as all volunteers and affiliates are required to since the proximity of their relationship may expose them to information not intended for public release. Council Representatives are bound by the terms of that agreement, as all other participants are.

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<sup>14</sup> As defined in the EULA/TOS.

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